Camp David Agreements

James A. Baker III, Secretary of State under President George H. W. Bush, said that the agreements „establish the principles of the land for peace and recognition of United Nations resolutions that were very helpful to us in the first Bush administration.“ Camp David has also set a precedent for other Middle East peace agreements, including the one between Israel and Jordan, Baker said, adding, „For my part, I remain optimistic that we will see in my life a comprehensive peace“ based on Camp David and subsequent agreements. The Camp David Agreement consists of two separate agreements: „A Framework for Peace in the Middle East“ and „A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel“, the second culminating in the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty signed in March 1979. Both the agreements and the peace treaty were accompanied by „side letters“ of the agreement between Egypt and the United States. and Israel and the United States. [16] Nevertheless, Egypt and Israel have reached agreement on a number of previously controversial issues. The resulting Camp David Accords essentially contained two separate agreements. The first, entitled „A framework for peace in the Middle East“, called for the agreements to also lay the foundations for the Oslo Accords signed by Israel and the agreements signed in 1993, which had solved important problems and enabled the region to take a step towards a lasting, still elusive peace. At about 5:30 that afternoon, Carter conducted his final act of mediation and convinced Bégin not to visit Sadat to congratulate him on the conclusion of the talks. Carter felt that their hostility was so strong that even a brief encounter could wipe everything out.

After Bégin`s agreement, Vance turned to Carter. „That`s it,“ he told the president. „I think you have it.“ Carter was sitting in a chair, looking tired and smiling nostalgically. No one applauded. Everyone in the room knew that the president`s success was flawed, with a language of compromise that sewn many disagreements. The move arose from a zeal to seek help from NATO countries to improve Egypt`s struggling economy, a belief that Egypt should start focusing more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbors and help resolve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Bégin`s reaction to Sadaat`s initiative, although what Sadat or Carter did not expect, showed the willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Bégin saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country`s best interest.

It would allow Israel to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation, which could try to use its size to make undesirable or unacceptable demands. Israel believed that Egypt could help Israel protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern Communists. Moreover, the opening of direct negotiations between heads of State and Government – summit diplomacy – would distinguish Egypt from its Arab neighbours. Carter`s people apparently had no idea of the secret conversations in Morocco between Dayan`s representative and Sadaat`s representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat`s initiative. In fact, Egypt and Israel piled up in some way to oust Carter from his Geneva trail. The fundamental message of Sadats` speech in the Knesset was the call for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Sadat`s visit was the first step towards negotiations such as the Cairo Preliminary Conference in December 1977. The UN General Assembly rejected the framework of peace in the Middle East because the agreement was reached without the participation of the UN and the PLO and not with the Palestinian right of return, self-determination and national independence and sovereignty. .

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